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1
Introduction
Stan van Hooft
Two very signifi cant developments have marked the fi eld of ethics and moral theory over 
the last fi ft y years or so. First, there has been the emergence of a new area of discussion 
(or the revival of an old one) called “virtue ethics” as a distinct fi eld within moral theory 
alongside utilitarianism, deontology and the oft - neglected natural law theory of morality. 
Second, there has been an increased attention on issues in applied or practical ethics with 
the main focus initially turned on bioethics but soon extending to ethical issues in a large 
range of professional fi elds and issues relevant to social policy and individual behaviour. 
As a result of the interaction between these two developments, virtue ethics has become 
a distinctive fi eld with theoretical approaches and methodologies of its own along with a 
range of applications of unusually wide scope. It is timely, then, to collect and publish the 
refl ections of leading contributors to debates on the most important current themes in 
virtue ethics. Th e Handbook of Virtue Ethics is devoted to collecting these refl ections. It is 
hoped that such a publication will prove useful for specialists in the fi eld of virtue ethics 
and its many sister fi elds in philosophy, sociology and theology, as well as for those whose 
concerns are more directly practical in such fi elds as law, politics and bioethics.
Th e chapters are written by those at the forefront of the fi eld with established inter-
national track records on a variety of related topics. Th ere are also contributions from 
younger scholars bringing a fresh approach to a burgeoning fi eld. Moreover, the collection 
aims to attain a global relevance by including chapters that embrace a variety of major 
cultural traditions aside from the Western tradition. Th e authors of each chapter were 
asked to summarize and critically comment on the most important work that has been 
done by ethicists to date on the relevant theme. Rather than merely summarizing previous 
work and insights, however, authors were also asked to contribute their “next big thought” 
on the topic they were writing on. Accordingly, many chapters are both comprehensive 
overviews of the state of the art and predictors of future directions. Many also have a 
polemical thrust. Th us this handbook is intended to both map the emergence of virtue 
ethics and also provide a framework for future developments.
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Th e themes selected for the chapters of the handbook refl ect several considerations. 
One is to summarize the most interesting and exciting work that has been done by ethi-
cists in this area over the past several decades and to show how specifi cally virtue- ethical 
approaches have emerged as signifi cant new directions in moral theory. An example of this 
is work on the virtue theory of right action that has seen lively debate in recent years. A 
second consideration is to draw attention to pressing moral issues that admit of a virtue- 
ethical approach, even if they have been relatively under- theorized by virtue ethicists. 
Th e discussion of the virtues required of business executives provides a good example. A 
third consideration is to embrace non- Western traditions of refl ection on virtue. A fourth 
consideration is to extend the methodological background for virtue ethics beyond that of 
analytic philosophy and to embrace the phenomenological and post- Hegelian traditions 
of continental European philosophy and other relevant disciplines such as psychology.
SOME HISTORY
Virtue ethics is a distinctive approach to ethical and moral issues. In its contemporary 
Western guise it was inaugurated by a seminal essay published in 1958 by Elizabeth 
Anscombe entitled “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Th e line of thought introduced in this 
essay was continued in a ground- breaking book, Aft er Virtue, published by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in 1981. Bernard Williams’s 1985 book, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
was also infl uential in challenging the hegemony of what Williams called “the morality 
system”. Th e conception of virtue ethics proposed by these writers and the many who were 
infl uenced by them appeals to the concern of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato for the 
harmony of the soul. In contemporary terms this would be a concern for the individual’s 
character. Most signifi cantly, their appeal was to Aristotle and his conception of eudai-
monia (oft en translated as “human fl ourishing”) as the goal of ethics. In this tradition, 
the normativity of the virtues arises from social and existential standards of honour and 
admirability rather than having objective grounds in religion, pure reason or utilitarian 
calculation. Accordingly, this conception would see it as a limitation on the scope of virtue 
ethics to confi ne it to the resolution of such specifi cally moral questions as which actions 
are right or wrong. As Anscombe put it:
Th e concepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, that is to 
say – and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought”, 
ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, 
or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer 
generally survives, and are only harmful without it. (1958: 1)
Whereas mainstream moral thinking concerns itself with what we are required to do, 
forbidden from doing or permitted to do, with some consideration also being given to 
so- called supererogatory actions which are morally laudable without being required, the 
virtue approach is less concerned with the moral status of actions than with the virtuous 
status of the agent. Virtue ethics theorizes the characteristic states of the agent which 
lead to action, deeming those that lead to morally good actions or, more broadly, socially 
acceptable actions, to be virtues, and those that lead to unacceptable or morally bad actions 
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as vices. In this way, the focus is upon what sort of person one is rather than upon what 
sorts of actions one performs. Th is focus allows for an exploration of motivations and 
leads to refl ection upon the inner lives of agents. It leads to an understanding of our moral 
psychology and is sensitive to the complexities and obscurities of our motivational lives. 
Th e goal of thinking about virtue is not just to decide upon which actions are required of 
us, but the enrichment and deepening of our lives as sensitive and deliberative individuals 
and as responsible members of society. As Cliff ord Williams puts it,
Virtue accounts for the value we attach to motives and other inner states. It fi ts 
with the fact that persons and their character, not actions, are the basic items of 
moral predication. It explains why we regard enrichment as signifi cant. Overall, 
it helps us to understand our moral lives better than does the concept of duty or 
consequences, or even both duty and consequences. (2005: 10)
Such an orientation places the accent on the good rather than the right, where the good 
is understood as the complex of values and ideals through commitment to which we con-
stitute our identity and sense of self- worth, while the right is that which duty enjoins us 
to do. Moreover, the scope of virtue ethics diff ers from the scope of the morality of duty. 
Its scope is wider because it embraces norms that have no moral signifi cance, such as the 
norms of etiquette. It is a virtue to be pleasant to others, but it would seem to be pushing 
the concept of obligation too far to say that we have a duty to do so.
Nevertheless, there are many virtue ethicists today who continue to explore the way 
in which conceptions of virtue might play a theoretical role in the context of the modern 
morality of duty. Th is role is that of providing a new way of establishing which actions 
are right and which are wrong, and also a new way of providing guidance to the moral 
novice as to which actions are right or wrong. Saying that a right action is one that would 
be performed by a virtuous agent is off ered as an alternative to saying that it is one which 
answers to the moral demands that arise from human nature, or that it is one which could 
be universalized by a rational agent, or that it is one which would conduce to the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. In this way virtue ethics has come to be seen as off ering 
a coherent and plausible alternative to utilitarian and deontological approaches to ethics; 
one in which reference to character and virtue are indispensable to the justifi cation of 
right action.
Th is book off ers no reconciliation between the various strands of virtue- ethical think-
ing represented in it. What it does off er is a rich and compelling account of a way of think-
ing about ethics that will have utility and validity for many years to come.
THE CONTENTS OF THE BOOK
Part I: Normative theory
Books of this kind oft en begin with a historical survey: one that standardly includes chap-
ters about Aristotle. We have taken a less direct route to the same destination by begin-
ning our collection with a chapter that demonstrates Aristotle’s ongoing contemporary 
relevance. Anne Baril writes about “eudaimonism” in contemporary virtue ethics. What 
does the notion of eudaimonia mean and to what extent does it still infl uence our thinking 
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today? It clearly means something more than well- being and its infl uence extends to utili-
tarianism and Kantianism almost as much as virtue theory. According to Baril, a virtue 
ethics is eudaemonist if it recommends that one lives one’s life in such a way as to aim for 
eudaimonia and if it recommends that one acquire the canonical virtues (courage, justice, 
honesty, etc.) as the character traits through which one can achieve this.
Matt Sharpe continues the loose historical trajectory of the early chapters by detailing 
the concepts of virtue developed by the Stoic philosophers. He examines the key Stoic 
claims that a life well lived is one characterized by what Zeno termed a “smooth fl ow”, and 
then explores the Stoic claim that virtue is the only good, so that external “goods” are in 
fact not goods but “indiff erents”. Making a connection with the contribution to the book 
by Timothy Chappell, Sharpe’s chapter then argues that, for the Stoics, virtue consists in a 
“stochastic technē” or “technē of living”, characterized by a wise reservation concerning our 
attachments to external things. On the basis of these theoretical foundations, Sharpe then 
examines the Stoic table of virtues, noting its contrast with Aristotle’s comparable table 
in the Nicomachean Ethics. Particular attention is paid to the transformed Stoic emphasis 
on courage and megalopsychia or great- souledness, and their strange claims that logic and 
physics are virtues. Sharpe then discusses recurrent criticisms of Stoic virtue ethics, and 
fl ags the shapes of Stoic responses to these critical charges.
Taking his cue from the work of Philippa Foot, Richard Hamilton explores the role of 
naturalism in virtue ethics, asking whether ethical values exist in the world or are merely 
the projection of human valuations onto a neutral world. If the latter view is to be rejected, 
the kind of naturalism to which virtue ethics is committed needs to be explored. Hamilton 
rejects the kind of scientistic or reductionist account of ethics provided, for example, by 
evolutionary biology. However, he says we should be wary of “conceptual purism”: the 
idea that philosophy should have no truck with empirical matters. Hamilton defends 
a form of naturalism which is liberal and pluralistic, and stands in a dialogic relation-
ship with other disciplines. He draws upon new trends in biology in order to show that 
values can be discovered to already exist in the biological world and thus that virtue can 
be understood as a response to them which is both cognitive and emotional. Moreover, 
these values owe as much to culture and upbringing as they do to biology – but they are 
no less naturalistic for that.
One important form of naturalism in moral theory – and also an important form of 
virtue ethics – is “moral sentimentalism”. Michael Slote is the principal spokesperson for 
this view today. His chapter begins with a historical survey that locates the Western origins 
of this view in the work of Augustine, Hume and Hutcheson. He makes reference also to 
the Eastern traditions which are discussed more fully in other chapters of this volume. 
Slote then goes on to argue that moral sentimentalism can off er us accounts of moral 
rightness, social justice and liberal policies in relation to hate speech and spousal violence 
that are superior to the accounts off ered by deontological and Kantian theories. In so far 
as moral sentimentalism is a form of virtue ethics, these arguments deserve close scrutiny 
on the part of any proponent of virtue ethics.
In his chapter, Justin Oakley highlights some key diff erences between virtue ethics 
and various forms of utilitarianism, particularly in regard to the value of virtues and the 
relevance of motives to right action. He then discusses several major concerns that utilitar-
ians and consequentialists more generally have recently raised about virtue ethics. Virtue 
ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse have responded to such criticisms and Oakley 
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demonstrates how their responses illuminate some important aspects of the approach. 
Oakley also highlights areas of common ground between virtue ethics and utilitarian 
perspectives, such as their consensus on the importance of doing “empirically informed 
ethics”. He then discusses in more detail how an agent’s motives can bear on the right-
ness of their actions and how this phenomenon is better accommodated by virtue ethics 
than by utilitarianism, despite some recent utilitarian attempts to recognize the moral 
signifi cance of motives. In closing, Oakley considers what implications the increasing 
overlap between virtue ethics and recent Kantian approaches on this and certain other 
issues might have for the plausibility of utilitarianism. He also raises a new challenge for 
approaches that link motive and character to right action and briefl y discusses how this 
issue might be best addressed.
Timothy Chappell takes vigorous issue with those theorists who would defi ne virtue 
ethics, in contrast to utilitarianism and Kantianism, as not concerned with the follow-
ing of moral rules. He takes issue also with the close cousin of this view: particular-
ism.1 Chappell describes a wide variety of kinds of rules and argues that acting virtuously 
cannot avoid at least some of these kinds. Indeed, it may oft en be the case that following 
a rule is constitutive of a virtue. To make this point, Chappell highlights the link that 
Aristotle makes between virtue and technē. Just as following various kinds of rules is 
constitutive of a technē, so it is oft en constitutive of a virtue. Chappell does admit that 
there could be no virtue ethics in which the rules are foundational in the way that they 
are for the Kantian or the utilitarian. Virtue ethics denies that it is imperative to keep the 
rules just because they are the rules. But that is not to deny that the excellence of acting 
virtuously cannot be grounded in the rules of a practice through which that excellence 
can be realized.
Given the length, breadth and sophistication of the Christian tradition, Christian 
moral theology off ers a wealth of resources for contemporary virtue ethicists, whether 
they are working within a Christian theological framework or not, argues Glen Pettigrove. 
His chapter highlights four strands within recent theologically informed work on virtue 
ethics, each of which is directly relevant to current controversies in moral philosophy: 
(a) Th omistic virtue ethics, (b) narrativist virtue ethics, (c) neo- Augustinian virtue ethics 
and (d) divine motivation theory. Along the way Pettigrove sheds light on what it means 
to off er a virtue ethic, as opposed to a virtue theory.
Although there is no attempt to off er a historical survey of virtue ethics in these chap-
ters, it is true that we started with Aristotelian themes, moved on to Stoicism, discussed 
Th omas Aquinas among others, and then explored Hume’s and even Kant’s approaches 
to virtue. In this spirit we should also discuss Friedrich Nietzsche’s contributions to the 
tradition. Christine Swanton’s chapter argues for the validity of Nietzsche’s place in the 
pantheon of virtue ethicists. She rejects the view that Nietzsche is a mere immoralist 
and off ers an understanding of his depth psychology, showing that it is essential to his 
account of the virtues of the “virtuous egoist”, by contrast with the correlative vices of the 
immature egoist and the self- sacrifi cing altruist. Defending this reading of Nietzsche is 
not yet to defend a reading of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist and so Swanton goes on to 
interpret Nietzsche as a virtuous egoist in order to argue that his ethical views are indeed 
a form of virtue ethics. Swanton then argues against objections to a virtue- ethical reading 
of Nietzsche that stem from Nietzsche’s apparent relativism and perspectivism, and from 
Nietzsche’s alleged communitarianism.
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Th e question as to the relation between virtue and right action has been mentioned 
several times and there are essays in the book that address this question directly. Liezl 
Van Zyl broaches this question by way of a thorough exploration of the agent- centred 
view developed by Christine Swanton, in which the rightness of an action depends upon 
the degree to which the target of a relevant virtue has been reached. In exploring this 
view, Van Zyl discovers that “rightness” is an attribute that oft en takes the outcome of an 
action into account while the “goodness” of an action is an attribute that refers more to 
the motivations and character of the agent. She discovers also that rightness conceived 
within a virtue- ethical framework can be a matter of degree and that the rightness of an 
action and its obligatoriness can come apart.
Jason Kawall’s chapter examines two prominent virtue- ethical approaches to the ques-
tion of what makes an action right: (a) “qualifi ed agent” accounts which argue that a right 
action is that action that would be performed by an agent who is qualifi ed to judge, that 
is, a virtuous agent; and (b) agent- based virtue ethics, which argues that a right action 
is one that stems from the virtuous motivations of the agent. Kawall also considers how 
these two approaches impinge on what is meant by the term “right action”. A variation of 
Socrates’ question posed to Euthyphro seems apt: is a right action right because a virtuous 
agent would perform it or would a virtuous agent perform it because it is right? Or again, 
is a right action right because virtuous motivations would lead one to perform it, or would 
virtuous motivations lead one to perform such an action because it is right? Th e second 
option in these questions demands an independent account of rightness such as might 
be off ered by mainstream moral theory. But virtue ethics claims to be able to rest on the 
fi rst option in each case. Kawall turns to a series of important objections that have been 
raised against these accounts, and considers some of the more prominent and promising 
responses that these objections have inspired.
Yuval Eylon off ers an intriguing argument which challenges the dependence on the 
part of many virtue ethicists on the paradigm of the “virtuous person” (VP) in such a 
way as to assert that what the VP would do in a given situation is what virtue demands 
of us. Th is may solve the problem of how ethical norms can be both objective and also 
“for us” so as to be motivational (because the VP is one of us), but there is still the dif-
fi culty of understanding whether what is demanded of us is demanded because the VP 
would do it, or whether the VP would do it because it was, independently, demanded of 
us. However, Eylon’s main point is that the values and norms encapsulated by the VP are 
not determinate. Positing a VP as a yardstick cannot be foundational. We recognize a VP 
on the basis of values that we either already possess or fi rst have to choose, and it would 
be circular for this choice to be based on what the VP has already chosen. Eylon shows, 
on the basis of Wittgensteinian arguments developed by John McDowell, that there is no 
independent or objective way of identifying the VP and that, as a result, any delineation 
of such a standard will be prescriptive.
What is it that motivates us to virtue if it is not a deontological concern for rightness? 
Van Hooft  points out that virtue is oft en defi ned with reference to society or its practices. It 
highlights character traits which are deemed admirable in a person in so far as that person is 
useful to society and conducive to the success of its practices. But from the virtuous person’s 
own point of view it relates to one’s sense of identity and takes its motivational power from 
the sense of self- worth which it gives to that virtuous person. Th e existential project of being 
virtuous is not a matter of conforming to social expectations or objective moral norms: it 
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is a matter of fulfi lling one’s own ideals of oneself. But where do these ideals come from? 
Are they constituted by the ideal of acting as a rational agent, as Christine Korsgaard has 
argued? Given what Sabina Lovibond has described as our communitarian second nature, 
the moral forms that our moral communities impart to us allow us to affi  rm ourselves as 
the persons we are in the context of our societies, and to express our inclinations in forms 
acceptable to, and structured by, our surrounding culture. Pursuing her rejection of the 
priority of psychology, Lovibond rejects any appeal to metaphysical entities such as free will 
or even self- conscious intentions housed in a mind in her account of practical rationality. 
For her, to act morally is not to give oneself the moral law so as to constitute one’s freedom, 
or to be driven by benevolent sentiments such as caring. It is to express our socially formed 
virtue in action. Accordingly, this chapter argues that virtue lies at the deepest levels of our 
existential being in which our quest to be who we are is tied to our moral concern for others. 
In its most general sense, being virtuous involves being motivated to act in accordance 
with internalized identity- confi rming norms in ways appropriate to one’s situation so as to 
express and confi rm one’s identity as a socially formed, responsible agent.
Part II: Types of virtues
Th e book then turns to an exploration of specifi c virtues. It is not possible to be exhaus-
tive and to create a defi nitive list of the virtues that anyone should have in order to live 
life well irrespective of their circumstances or occupation. Not only do the limitations of 
space prevent this, but it also turns out to be theoretically too complex to defi ne virtues 
in a clearly delimited way. Th ere are some theorists who suggest that there is just one fun-
damental virtue – usually cited as phronēsis – while others suggest that there are as many 
virtues as there are circumstances in which their exercise is required. Th e enumeration of 
virtues, in short, is itself an interesting and diffi  cult challenge. Candace Upton’s chapter 
begins this part of the book by broaching this issue. She illustrates the problem by discuss-
ing several authors who describe virtues in specifi c contexts: that of judges in law courts, 
doctors in clinics, responsible citizens in an environmentally vulnerable world, and human 
beings in a world conceived only in general terms. Th e more specifi c a context becomes, 
the more detailed and various are the virtues that are called for in it. However, as Liezl 
Van Zyl pointed out in a footnote in her chapter, identifying a distinct virtue for each of 
myriad circumstances gives rise to the “enumeration problem”: namely, that a theory with 
infi nitely many virtues cannot make sense of the notion of overall virtuousness (see D. 
Russell 2009: 143ff .). Upton goes on to discuss the various ways in which her authors draw 
upon theories of virtue ethics: some see the virtues in instrumental terms, while others 
see them as goods in themselves. Important too are the inherent and intrinsic values that 
populate the fi elds in which the virtues are to be exercised. Th eoretical clarity on these 
issues will be required if we are to reach agreement on what virtues there are. Th at said, 
however, this book then proceeds with a relatively arbitrary listing of virtues to which 
consideration should be given.
In her chapter, Heather Battaly addresses three key debates about intellectual virtue that 
are directly relevant to virtue ethics. Th e fi rst section raises three objections to Aristotle’s 
distinction between the contemplative and calculative intellectual virtues. Th e following 
section describes reliabilist and responsibilist analyses of intellectual virtue and suggests 
that we need not choose between reliabilist and responsibilist analyses. Arguably, virtue 
not for reproduction or distribution
8 INTRODUCTION
reliabilists and virtue responsibilists are both partly correct. Achieving truth matters, but 
so does caring about truth. Finally, Battaly argues that hard- wired, reliabilist intellec-
tual virtues are distinct from moral virtues in that they are more like skills or abilities. 
Responsibilist intellectual virtues are more likely candidates for having moral signifi cance. 
But we will not be able to distinguish responsibilist intellectual virtues from moral virtues 
until we settle on the scope of “the moral”.
Lorraine Code off ers some insights into a central intellectual virtue that she calls “epis-
temic responsibility”. While this virtue involves such stances as humility and sensitivity in 
relation to the objects of knowledge and to the manner in which one seeks it, the central 
importance that Code places upon it is that it overcomes the masculinist and Western 
distortions of traditional ways of gathering knowledge and of “philosophy” understood 
as a dominant but biased discourse. Th e virtues that are required to gain knowledge suc-
cessfully and sensitively are also required in order to take appropriate stances on political, 
social and environmental issues. Taking a cue from recent developments in social episte-
mology, Code argues that epistemic virtues are necessary, not just to ensure the truth of 
knowledge claims, but also to ensure their ideological correctness.
Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael Levine have written extensively on 
the virtue of integrity and contribute a chapter which captures their most recent refl ec-
tions on this topic. Th ey see the concept as encapsulating two ideas: that of a structurally 
integrated personality and that of moral uprightness. To explore the fi rst of these they 
discuss the work of Harry Frankfurt and his concept of “wholeheartedness”, fi nding that 
it does not suffi  ciently allow for an individual to have simultaneous commitments to 
incommensurable values. Such dual commitments are problematic, especially if they are 
identity- forming in the way that Bernard Williams has described, but it should be possi-
ble to live life seriously – and thus with integrity – while adhering to such values. “Living 
seriously” is the key idea in this chapter but before the authors can develop it further 
they have to meet the possible objection that integrity is not a virtue at all, but rather an 
executive stance rather like determination. Indeed, it transpires that it is a master virtue 
the exercise of which reinforces any other virtues an agent might display. What it comes 
down to is being able to take seriously all of the commitments and values upon which one 
bases one’s life while yet charting a coherent course through their various demands. In so 
far as some of these values will be moral and in so far as the coherence is structural, we 
have here the two aspects of integrity that make it a genuine virtue. With this virtue one 
can successfully take one’s life seriously.
A frequently mentioned and oft en discussed canonical virtue is courage. And a per-
sistent question about courage is whether it can be displayed even by a villain intent on 
evil in the face of danger. A related issue is whether it is merely an executive skill, needed 
to overcome a variety of diffi  culties which elicit fear, or whether it is genuinely a virtue. 
Patrick Shade’s chapter confronts these questions by drawing a distinction between the 
internal and external aims of a virtue and by arguing that virtue involves a balance between 
feelings and rationality. From these points he concludes that the separation of the aims 
of an action – which might be noble or ignoble – from the feelings and motivations that 
enter into it – which might be a mean between fear and foolhardiness – are artifi cial and 
misleading.
Raja Halwani and Elliot Layda discuss the virtue of wit or that of being witty. Or rather, 
they question whether there is such a virtue. Aristotle certainly thought there was. Wit 
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seems to share many of the structural characteristics of virtue, admitting as it does of 
extremes of defi ciency and excess. Moreover, it conduces to a good life in that being able 
to face the diffi  culties of life with a sense of humour enhances our capacity to live life to 
the full. It seems to be a social virtue as well in that it can lubricate diffi  cult or awkward 
situations between people. Even ethical theories other than virtue ethics applaud wit as a 
moral good. And yet, Halwani and Layda are not convinced. Th ey point out that we are 
not morally required to be witty and that this trait therefore falls outside of the scope of 
what we would normally regard as a moral virtue. A world without wit might yet have the 
same moral quality as a world with one, indeed, it may even be a better world.
Jeanine Grenberg discusses humility. She points out that early modern philosophers like 
David Hume and Mary Wollstonecraft  were suspicious of this virtue because it involved 
dissembling about one’s awareness of one’s capacities in order to curry favour with others. 
Hume also saw it as a “monkish” virtue, while Wollstonecraft  thought it compromised our 
willingness to take decisive action. Th e problem as Grenberg sees it is that these concep-
tions of humility depend on seeing it as involving a comparison that the self is making 
with others. To avoid these problems, then, she seeks a conception of humility that does 
not depend on such comparisons but is based on an absolute appraisal of the self. She fi nds 
such a conception in Kant with his view that we are legislators of the moral law. Given that 
we also fail to live up to this law, we should all be humble.
Love is a fi eld in which virtue would seem to occupy an important place. Mike W. 
Martin develops this thought but not without also mentioning moral norms of justice 
that are relevant to relationships centred on sexual love. For Martin, virtue is not an 
exclusive moral requirement in sexual love, but enhances the moral quality of relation-
ships with such virtues as caring, respect, faithfulness, sexual fi delity, honesty, fairness 
and responsibility. His explication of these virtues highlights the complexity of love as a 
human phenomenon.
In their chapter, David McNaughton and Eve Garrard argue for a conception of forgiv-
ingness which highlights the restoration of good will on the part of a victim towards the 
perpetrator of the wrong from which that victim has suff ered. On this conception one can 
forgive the unrepentant while, if necessary, protesting and resisting the wrong, and justifi -
ably refusing fully to restore the relationship one has had with that person. Such forgiving 
is not unconditional even though it is freely given. Th is contrasts with the conception of 
the act of forgiving as “wiping the slate clean” in such a way as to leave the situation and 
relationship between victim and perpetrator much as it was before the off ence occurred. 
Only the fi rst conception allows for restorative justice and the new moral demands that 
the victim may make on the perpetrator. Th e virtue of forgivingness involves an acknowl-
edgement of the new interpersonal framework that exists between the aff ected parties. 
But such a framework should be free of resentment and rancour since only those who 
overcome resentment display the virtue of forgivingness.
One of the canonical virtues throughout the long history of the topic has been justice. It 
comes as a surprise then that the ancient founders of virtue ethics, Plato, Aristotle and the 
Stoics, never fully understood justice, as Mark LeBar argues. According to LeBar, it is the 
Kantian tradition that has given us a fuller account of what justice consists in. Accordingly, 
the classical notion of justice as a personal virtue for an individual needs to be enhanced 
by the central Kantian idea of respect for persons. However, modern approaches to justice, 
such as that of John Rawls, suggest that justice is primarily a quality that arises from social 
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institutions and arrangements. If this were true, the justice of an individual would derive 
from his adherence to just social norms, while if it were primarily an individual virtue, it 
would arise from the well- formed character of that individual.
Th addeus Metz gives us a fascinating account of virtue in the context of sub- Saharan 
Africa. He argues against the received view that the highest standards of virtue among 
pre- colonial African peoples was and remains centred solely on community. Instead he 
suggests that another major value to which sub- Saharan African peoples respond is that 
of vitality. He also outlines ways in which community and vitality may lead some cultures 
away from the standards of justice and tolerance to which westerners give priority.
We then turn to the tradition of Confucianism which originated in ancient China. 
Focusing on what he describes as “classical Confucianism” and using a permissive concep-
tion of virtue ethics, Hui- chieh Loy argues that Confucianism is indeed a virtue ethics by 
highlighting three features: fi rst, the emphasis placed upon the exemplary ethical agent, 
or junzi, and his attributes; second, the attention paid to detailed, rich and “particularist” 
descriptions of individual agents and the narratives of their conduct as exemplifying dif-
ferent grades of ethical achievement; and third, the contrast of this way of thinking with 
the somewhat principle- based tradition of Mohism. Loy goes on to explicate the three 
key virtue attributes central to classical Confucianism, namely, ren, yi and li, drawing 
some parallels with virtue concepts in the Western traditions in the process. What is most 
distinctive in the Confucian tradition is the focus on ritual propriety, but, rather than this 
being an empty formalism, Loy succeeds in showing its importance for the harmonious 
functioning of one’s community.
Continuing our survey of the way non- Western traditions have understood virtue, 
Purushottama Bilimoria invites us to consider the Hindu tradition, with some reference 
also to its Buddhist off shoots and Jainist cousins. Bilimoria highlights the diffi  culty of 
gleaning an ethical theory in the Western sense from the tradition of ethical thinking on 
the Indian sub- continent where such thinking is always fi rmly embedded in practice and 
concrete refl ection. Th e metaphysical underpinnings of that tradition are also foreign to 
us, with it stress on dharma understood as a cosmic reality into which one’s own actions 
are inscribed as both obligatory and contributory. Because of this, the Western distinc-
tion between the right and the good is overcome and a new form of moral approbation 
called for. Central to this form will be the place of appropriate emotions. Whereas Western 
morality focuses on actions and agents, Indian ethical thought, while not ignoring these, 
focuses also on how we should feel. Bilimoria illustrates this with an extended discussion 
of the dialogue between the warrior Arjuna and his god- charioteer Krishna as it appears 
in the epic Th e Mahābhārata, narrated in the book known as the Bhagavad Gītā. In this 
dialogue Arjuna’s emotions in eff ect constitute his appropriate judgements. Th is story 
also illustrates the continuing role that desire plays in the ethical life – as opposed to the 
suspicion of desire that occurs in the Western tradition all the way from the Stoics to Kant. 
Ethical judgements in the Indian traditions are similar to those of virtue ethics, then, in 
so far as they valorize the way a person should be as well as act, and in so far as this, in 
turn, concerns how a person should feel. Virtuous emotions are the key to such an ethics. 
In order to illustrate the practical relevance of these refl ections, Bilimoria adds a section 
on bioethics. And this provides a nice segue into the next part of the book.
But fi rst Leesa S. Davis introduces us to the ethical world of Buddhism. With virtues 
inextricable from a complex metaphysical worldview, the explication of Buddhist virtue 
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ethics is never going to be simple. Given that the self is seen as impermanent and prone 
to the error of reifi cation the focus is going to be on those virtues that ensure the right 
attitude and cognitive stance towards reality. Such more practical virtues as compassion 
can only grow on the basis of the kind of mindfulness and non- attachment that will ensure 
appropriate immersion into Buddhist metaphysics. With copious references to the canoni-
cal Buddhist texts, Davis off ers an accessible introduction to this esoteric world.
Recep Alpyagil gives us a fascinating account of the virtues as elaborated in the primary 
text of Islam: the Qur’an. While a great many virtues are mentioned in this essentially 
ethical religious text, the central ones are said to be generosity, justice and doing better 
(ihsan). Following his account of these, Alpyagil goes on to speak of three intellectual 
virtues that are also highlighted in the Qur’an: namely, reasoning, discernment (furkan) 
and wisdom. While the Aristotelian origins of these concepts can be seen fairly clearly, 
the distinctive Islamic slant which they are given off ers us a fresh perspective on virtues 
which are clearly central to human life anywhere.
Part III: Applied ethics
Th e discourse of virtue ethics is becoming increasingly relevant in medical ethics and 
Matthew McCabe explores the relevance of a specifi c form of virtue ethics – that which 
centres on caring – in his chapter. McCabe argues that a virtue ethics of care is much 
more able than deontological approaches both to explain the moral decisions which our 
intuitions would suggest to us and to off er advice to those caught in morally ambiguous 
situations. Provided a physician (and interestingly, also a patient) cares about the relevant 
issues, both in relation to the patient and to persons in the larger context of the specifi c 
case, morally admirable decisions can be made without recourse to strict or absolute 
principles. Confi dentiality, for example, might be waived if valid concern for the interests 
of third parties is pressing. Both in end- of- life decisions such as active euthanasia and 
beginning- of- life issues such as “wrongful disability”, a virtue ethics of care can provide 
guidance and insight by focusing on the caring motives of the relevant parties.
Given recent turmoil in the fi nancial markets and in the world economy – much of it 
brought about by venial motivations and unbridled greed – it is timely to consider the 
extent to which managers in business enterprises should be virtuous. Wim Vandekerckhove 
considers a number of notable fi gures in the world of fi nance, and also information tech-
nology, to see what virtues they may or may not have displayed in their careers before 
asking whether being virtuous was of advantage to them or to business more generally. 
Th e hidden, cynical question here is whether business might not be better off  and more 
successful if its practitioners were not virtuous. Drawing on stakeholder theory and the 
arguments of Robert Solomon, Vandekerckhove argues that virtue is both an inherent 
good in business and an instrumental good. To think that the pursuit of profi t is the sole 
aim of business is to fail to understand it as a practice that calls for virtue. He then off ers 
us a brief sketch of the virtues that are most relevant in this sphere of human activity.
Paul Kaak and David Weeks refl ect upon the virtues that are required for leadership 
to be both ethical and eff ective. Th e crux of their argument is that these goals need not 
be in tension: an ethical leader will also be an eff ective one. Th ey draw on sources such 
as Aristotle, Confucius and the authors of a leadership genre known as “mirrors for 
princes”. Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus may well be the original princely mirror and he 
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was followed by Erasmus and Machiavelli. Kaak and Weeks prefer the concept of character 
to that of virtue because it off ers a more stable basis upon which to assess both the ethical 
sensitivity and eff ectiveness of leaders. Th is allows them to draw upon modern manage-
ment studies and positive psychology as well as virtue ethics to make their case.
Military ethics is not a fi eld frequently discussed by virtue ethicists and so Peter 
Olsthoorn’s piece is a welcome addition to this book. While discussing such traditional 
soldierly virtues as courage, obedience and loyalty, Olsthoorn points out that, with the 
increasing use of military forces in peacekeeping and nation building missions, a broader 
range of virtues – and a broader interpretation of the traditional ones – may be required. 
Moreover, the object of many traditional virtues seems to be the protection of fellow 
soldiers and their armies. Virtues that focus on the need to protect non- combatants and 
citizens are therefore also in need of a new emphasis in military ethics education.
Michael McNamee tackles the issue of virtue in sport. Beginning with the intrigu-
ing suggestion that spectator sport is akin to a medieval morality play, McNamee asks 
whether there is a distinct set of virtues appropriate to competitive sport. Because sport 
is a rule- governed activity, it requires participants to be willing to abide by those rules. 
Th is is, however, merely the bottom line. Sport has a morally relevant role in the ethical 
formation of young people, in the pursuit of fi tness and fun on the part of weekend par-
ticipants, and in elite professional competition. In each of these fi elds a variety of virtues 
are appropriate, including courage, fair play and endurance. McNamee also discusses the 
way in which professional athletes are expected to be moral exemplars in the community 
and the attitudes that victors should display towards those whom they have defeated. Even 
a sports hero should display humility.
Blaine J. Fowers and Emily Winakur explore the virtues that should be displayed by 
psychotherapists from within a “eudaimonistic framework”. Th ey discuss the therapist’s 
virtues that show up in psychotherapy research that uncovers the key “common factors” 
shown to facilitate positive outcomes no matter what theoretical approaches to psycho-
therapy are being used. For example, they discuss “authentic commitment” which centres 
on the faith that the therapist has, and can convey, in the theoretical basis of their practice. 
Trustworthiness is also important. Th erapists should also be available to their patients and 
present to them in the therapeutic encounter. “Mentoring friendship” is another virtue that 
therapists must display. Fowers and Winakur argue that, in Aristotelian terms, therapeutic 
relationships are a combination of utility and character friendships. And there is, of course, 
the inescapable importance of practical wisdom.
Part IV: The psychology of virtue
Clea F. Rees and Jonathan Webber, like Cox, La Caze and Levine, have written about 
integrity and it was a diffi  cult decision to place their chapter, not in conjunction with 
the Cox et al. piece, but in the section exploring the interstices between virtue ethics and 
social psychology. It is placed here because it begins its exploration of integrity and its 
sister virtues of constancy and fi delity with an analysis drawn from “attitude psychology”, 
an analysis which shows that the central features of such virtues are attitudes of which the 
operative aspects are content and strength. Building on this foundation, Rees and Webber 
argue that constancy of commitment and fi delity to commitment essentially consist in a 
single strong attitude in favour of maintaining and acting on certain commitments and, 
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moreover, that these cannot count as virtues unless they are combined with a distinct 
strong attitude in favour of getting things right. Th eir account of integrity builds on these 
accounts of constancy and fi delity in order to show that the person of integrity is com-
mitted to maintaining and acting on those of their commitments that they consider most 
important, but also to getting it right. It is this last commitment that prevents the person 
of integrity from being infl exible in their commitments.
Nancy Eisenberg and her co- authors understand sympathy as a virtue marked by what 
they call “empathy- related responding”. Drawing upon research in social psychology, they 
discuss defi nitions of empathy- related responding, its role in virtue, moral development 
and social competence, and the development and origins of empathy- related responding. 
Th ey understand empathy with another to give rise to either sympathy or personal dis-
tress. Only in the former case does it lead to virtue. Empathy- related responding, especially 
sympathy, has been linked in the psychological literature to aspects of moral development 
such as prosocial behaviour, level of moral judgement, and to the reduction of aggression 
towards others. Th e authors allude to the work of Martin Hoff man, a researcher upon 
whom Michael Slote also draws, in order to explicate the processes by which a young person 
might acquire the capacity for empathy and thus the virtue of sympathy. Social competence 
and improved peer relationships are just some of the benefi ts of this virtue. Th is chapter 
is of special interest, therefore, in demonstrating the synergy between the philosophical 
discourse of virtue ethics and the empirical psychological discourse of character formation.
In his chapter, Christian Miller discusses a critique of virtue ethics that arises from the 
work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris; a critique that suggests that there is no evidence 
from social psychology that there are “global character traits” operative in the practical 
lives of normal people. It would follow from this claim that it does not make much sense 
to speak of people having virtues and vices in the way that these terms are understood 
in the Aristotelian tradition. Miller cedes some ground to this critique by agreeing that 
virtue may indeed be rarer than virtue ethicists commonly suppose. So a proponent of 
virtue ethics needs to explain why virtue is rare while retaining a belief in the importance 
of character. And so Miller asks whether Harman and Doris have a satisfactory account of 
what character is and whether there might not also be other mental states, such as fear of 
embarrassment, which enter into action to prevent virtuous responses. Even the posses-
sion of other virtues may inhibit responses which certain virtues call for. So, for example, 
compassion may lead one not to respond honestly to questions about a person’s appear-
ance. Miller also reviews the literature that criticizes the social psychology experiments 
upon which Harman and Doris depend in order to make their claims. But his main point 
is that virtue is indeed a rare and diffi  cult achievement.
Nancy Snow addresses the closely related situationist critique of “globalist” conceptions 
of character which suggest that it is not innate traits but the exigencies of the situations that 
agents fi nd themselves in that determine what those agents will do. She reviews studies 
cited by Doris and his colleagues that seem to make virtue contingent upon varying cul-
tural contexts and she critiques studies that suggest Western and Eastern conceptions of 
virtue – and even of ways of knowing – are fully distinct, so as to imply that there are no 
global character traits involved. Her concluding point is that virtue is not just a set of traits 
acquired by unconscious modes of personality formation nor a response to unconscious 
stimuli arising from specifi c situations, but the product of the exercise of practical reason 
in a variety of contexts. Th is has signifi cant implications for ethical education.
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Nafsika Athanassoulis addresses the question of how we should educate our children 
for virtue. She draws on Aristotle’s account of character in order to affi  rm the importance 
of this concept and in order to begin an account of how it might be shaped. Central to 
her argument is the view that teachers must themselves demonstrate the virtues they 
are seeking to impart. In more concrete terms, they must leave room for discussion and 
debate so that students can learn tolerance of diversity. Th is focus on discussion and 
openness is necessary to avoid indoctrination into specifi c forms of moral content and 
also to avoid being non- committal in relation to morality. Rather than relying only on 
moral exemplars, the important thing is to develop the right kind of rational and sensi-
tive appraisal of morally salient situations in students so that they can make their own 
decisions armed with moral acumen. It is important for students to learn not only what 
morality requires but also why it does so, and so a combination of aff ective engagement 
and rational appraisal is called for in morally sensitive contexts. Only teachers who them-
selves display these qualities can successfully bring their students to this level of virtue.
David Carr explores the question of how education in the virtues might be enhanced 
by the arts. Th is question raises epistemological issues not only about the truth- value of 
art, but also about the objectivity of the virtue norms that educationists might seek to 
impart. Given a narrative framework to the understanding of the human condition such 
as proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), art – and especially literature – may indeed 
provide models to emulate and, perhaps even more importantly, a normative structure of 
feeling and emotion such as would conduce to the formation of virtuous character.
Th e book is brought to an end by Pedro Alexis Tabensky in a highly refl ective piece. Th e 
chapter begins with a challenge to the perfectionism that, it is claimed, infects much of the 
virtue ethics tradition – especially as it stems from Aristotle. We are not gods capable of 
perfection but highly vulnerable creatures living in an uncertain and threatening environ-
ment. Our characters and moral achievements are unstable and our quest for virtue and 
integrity can never be complete. Th is is why virtue is necessary for us. Th e one virtue that 
must sustain us is that of love. While fear of radical separateness from others might drive 
this virtue, its expression forges genuine community. And it is this loving community, 
in turn, that provides a saving context for us in our vulnerable existence and which can 
helps us sustain our virtue.
NOTE
 1. I have espoused both positions as distinctive of virtue ethics in van Hooft  (2006b).
